DAW 2nd April 2026, Mains Answer Writting 2027

Question

Left Wing Extremism is no longer a major security threat but remains a developmental challenge.

Do you agree? Justify with suitable arguments.? (15 marks)

Model Answer

Approach:

Introduction

Begin by briefly defining LWE and its historical status as a major internal security threat.

Highlight the recent decline in violence and shift in nature.

End with a balanced stance: security threat reduced, but developmental issues persist.

Body

Divide the answer into two clear parts:

Why LWE is no longer a major security threat (data + security measures),

Why it remains a developmental challenge (root causes + governance gaps).

Add a short critical analysis (security vs development debate) and conclude with way forward.

Conclusion

Provide a balanced judgement acknowledging success in security but persistence of structural issues.

Emphasise the need for a holistic approach combining security, development, and governance reforms.

Introduction

Left Wing Extremism (LWE), rooted in socio-economic inequalities and tribal alienation, was once described as India’s “biggest internal security threat.” However, sustained security operations and governance interventions have significantly weakened its operational capacity. Yet, structural developmental deficits continue to sustain its residual presence.

Body

LWE No Longer a Major Security Threat

· Decline in Violence and Casualties

• LWE-related violence has witnessed a substantial decline, with incidents reducing by nearly

  88% between 2010 and 2025

  , indicating a sharp weakening of insurgent activity.

• The number of incidents has dropped from

  1936 in 2010 to around 234 in 2025

  , reflecting sustained success of counter-insurgency measures.

• Civilian and security force casualties have also declined by about

  90%

  , highlighting improved operational effectiveness and reduced threat levels.

· Geographical Contraction of LWE

• The geographical spread of LWE has reduced significantly, with affected districts declining from

  around 126 in 2013 to approximately 11–45 districts

  in recent years.

• The insurgency is now largely confined to isolated core areas such as

  Sukma, Bijapur, and Narayanpur

  , instead of spanning a large “Red Corridor.”

• Many districts have transitioned into “legacy and thrust areas,” requiring only consolidation rather than active counter-insurgency.

· Leadership Decimation and Organisational Decline

• Security forces have neutralised or forced the surrender of several top Maoist leaders, including key figures like

  Basavaraju

  , weakening the leadership hierarchy.

• The

  Politburo and Central Committee strength has reduced drastically

  , indicating organisational fragmentation and declining ideological cohesion.

• Internal divisions and loss of morale have further reduced recruitment and cadre strength.

· Effective Counter-Insurgency Strategy

• The

  SAMADHAN doctrine

  has institutionalised a comprehensive and intelligence-driven counter-LWE approach integrating security, intelligence, and development efforts.

• Coordinated operations such as

  Operation Prahar, Kagar, and Black Forest

  have significantly degraded Maoist infrastructure and operational capabilities.

• Financial networks of Maoists have been disrupted through action against

  levy collection, illegal taxation, shell NGOs, and cash-based funding channels

  .

· Expansion of State Presence and Infrastructure

• Significant progress has been made in expanding governance and infrastructure, including the installation of

  around 10,000 mobile towers and extensive road connectivity

  in LWE areas.

• More than

  400 security camps

  have been established, ensuring continuous state presence in previously inaccessible regions.

• Schemes like

  Road Requirement Plan (RRP) and RCPLWEA

  have enabled construction of

  roads

  ,

  improving connectivity and enabling both governance and security mobility.

• Establishment of

  EMRS schools, ITIs, and Skill Centres

  has improved education and livelihood opportunities, reducing recruitment into extremist groups.

LWE Remains a Developmental Challenge

· Persistence of Structural Socio-Economic Causes

• Fundamental drivers such as

  poverty, land alienation, unemployment, and tribal marginalisation

  continue to exist in LWE-affected areas.

• The movement historically emerged from

  inequality, exploitation, and governance deficits

  , many of which remain insufficiently addressed.

· Implementation Deficit in Welfare and Rights-Based Laws

• Progressive legislations such as the

  PESA Act, 1996 and Forest Rights Act, 2006

  suffer from weak implementation on the ground.

• Bureaucratic inertia and lack of local capacity have prevented effective realisation of

  tribal land and forest rights

  .

• This has resulted in continued

  alienation and distrust towards the state among tribal communities

  .

· Governance Deficit and Trust Deficit

• Many affected regions still face

  limited administrative reach and weak delivery of public services

  , undermining state legitimacy.

• Reports of

  security forces excesses and human rights violations

  have strained relations between security forces and local communities.

• Weak trust reduces community cooperation and affects intelligence gathering.

· Developmental Gaps in Core Areas

• LWE-affected regions continue to lag in

  healthcare, education, nutrition, and livelihood opportunities

  , reflecting uneven development.

• Although initiatives like

  Special Central Assistance (SCA)

  and Aspirational Districts Programme exist, their implementation remains uneven.

• Persistent developmental deficits sustain vulnerability to extremist ideologies.

· Risk of Post-Conflict Vacuum

• The

  “clear–hold–develop” strategy has not always been effectively implemented

  , leading to gaps in consolidation after security operations.

• In the absence of sustained governance, there is a risk of

  Maoist regrouping in vacated areas

  .

• Past experiences highlight that

  security gains are reversible without developmental follow-up

  .

· Tribal Rights and Resource Conflicts

• Development projects, particularly in mining and infrastructure, often lead to

  displacement without adequate rehabilitation and compensation

  .

• There are concerns about

  resource exploitation and “crony extraction” in post-LWE areas

  , which may further alienate tribal populations.

• Failure to ensure

  inclusive and participatory development

  may recreate conditions conducive to unrest.

Critical Analysis

· Security Success: Significant but Not Sufficient

• The decline in LWE-related violence and territorial spread clearly demonstrates the

  effectiveness of sustained security operations and political will

  .

• However, this success remains

  largely operational and tactical

  , as it has weakened the armed capacity of Maoists without fully addressing the deeper causes of the movement.

• The persistence of sporadic attacks and residual presence in core areas indicates that

  complete eradication is yet to be achieved

  .

· Weakening of Military Capability vs Persistence of Root Causes

• The

  military strength, leadership structure, and organisational capacity

  of CPI (Maoist) have been significantly degraded due to coordinated operations.

• Despite this, the

  ideological appeal of LWE—centered on issues of injustice, inequality, and tribal rights—continues to resonate

  in certain pockets.

• The continued existence of

  poverty, land alienation, and governance deficits

  provides fertile ground for the survival of extremist narratives.

· Risk of Over-Securitisation

• Excessive reliance on a

  security-centric approach may lead to alienation of local communities

  , especially in tribal regions.

• Instances of

  human rights violations, police excesses, and coercive measures

  can erode trust in the state and weaken intelligence networks.

• Such an approach risks transforming a developmental issue into a

  law-and-order problem alone

  , ignoring its socio-political dimensions.

· Risk of Under-Development and Governance Gaps

• Inadequate focus on development can lead to a

  post-conflict vacuum

  , where the absence of governance allows insurgent elements to regroup.

• Historical experience shows that

  security gains are reversible if not followed by sustained development and administrative consolidation

  .

• Uneven implementation of welfare schemes and infrastructure projects continues to limit the

  long-term impact of state interventions

  .

· Emergence of Urban Networks (“Urban Naxalism”)

• While rural insurgency has weakened, there are concerns regarding the

  shift of Maoist strategy towards urban areas and intellectual spaces

  .

• These networks aim to

  sustain the movement ideologically, influence discourse, and create narratives around state oppression and rights violations

  .

• The phenomenon highlights a

  transition from armed struggle to ideological and informational warfare

  , making the challenge more complex.

Way Forward

· Deepening Inclusive and Tribal-Centric Development

• Development strategies must be

  context-specific and tailored to tribal needs

  , focusing on sustainable livelihoods, forest-based economies, and local resource utilisation.

• Greater emphasis is needed on improving

  healthcare, education, nutrition, and skill development

  in remote and backward regions.

• Bridging regional disparities through targeted programmes can help

  reduce socio-economic grievances that fuel extremism

  .

· Effective Implementation of Rights-Based Frameworks

• Strengthening the implementation of

  Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006 and PESA Act, 1996

  is essential to ensure genuine empowerment of tribal communities.

• Ensuring

  secure land tenure, community forest rights, and participatory decision-making

  can reduce alienation.

• Land acquisition processes must be made

  transparent, consultative, and compensation-driven

  , with proper rehabilitation mechanisms.

· Governance Consolidation in Cleared Areas

• The state must ensure

  continuous administrative presence and service delivery

  in areas cleared of insurgents.

• Effective implementation of the

  “clear–hold–develop” strategy

  is critical to prevent the re-emergence of extremist influence.

• Strengthening local institutions such as

  Gram Panchayats and district administration

  will improve governance legitimacy.

· Community Engagement and Trust-Building

• Building trust between the state and local communities through

  community policing, dialogue, and participatory governance

  is essential.

• Community policing initiatives

  such as

  Jan Sampark Abhiyan”

  ,

  “Civic Action Programmes (CAP)

  by CAPFs, and local police outreach efforts should be expanded to build trust.

• Involving local populations in development planning can enhance

  ownership and accountability of state initiatives

  .

· Strengthening Rehabilitation and Surrender Policies

• The

  Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policy

  should be further strengthened to provide

  financial assistance, vocational training, and social reintegration

  for former cadres.

• Ensuring dignity and livelihood opportunities for surrendered cadres can

  discourage rejoining extremist groups

  .

• Skill development and employment linkages should be prioritised for long-term reintegration.

· Addressing the Ideological Dimension

• Countering Maoist ideology requires

  strengthening faith in democratic institutions and constitutional processes

  .

• Promoting awareness about

  rights, entitlements, and democratic participation

  can reduce the appeal of extremist narratives.

• Encouraging political inclusion and representation of tribal communities can help

  mainstream dissent within democratic frameworks

  .

Conclusion

LWE has undeniably declined as a major internal security threat due to sustained state action. However, it continues to reflect deep-rooted developmental and governance deficits. Lasting peace will depend not merely on eliminating armed cadres but on addressing the structural inequities that gave rise to the movement.