DAW 20th December 2025, Mains Answer Writting 2026

DAW 20th December  2025, Mains Answer Writting 2026

Question

Examine how the SHANTI Bill, 2025 enables private sector participation while retaining central government control over sensitive nuclear activities. (250 Words, 15 Marks).

Model Answer

Approach: Introduction:

  • Briefly introduce the SHANTI Bill, 2025 as a landmark reform that repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLNDA, 2010 to enable private participation while safeguarding sovereign control over sensitive nuclear domains.

Body:

  • Explain how the SHANTI Bill Enables Private Sector Participation.

  • Briefly describe how Central Government Control Is Retained.

  • Make a Critical Evaluation:

  • Reflects a hybrid model- market participation at the periphery, state control at the core.

  • Raises concerns over dilution of supplier accountability and excessive secrecy affecting transparency.

Conclusion:

  • Conclude that the SHANTI Bill recalibrates India’s nuclear policy by balancing private investment needs with strategic control, and that its success will depend on transparent rule-making, strong regulation and uncompromised safety governance.

Introduction:

  • The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025 represents a watershed reform in India’s nuclear governance. By repealing the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010, it seeks to unlock private capital and capability to achieve India’s ambitious target of 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047, while simultaneously preserving sovereign control over strategically sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Bill thus attempts a calibrated balance between economic liberalisation and national security imperatives.

Body: How the SHANTI Bill Enables Private Sector Participation:

  • Opening Nuclear Power Generation and Ancillary Activities:

  • The Bill permits both public and private entities to set up and operate nuclear power plants.

  • Private players are allowed participation in activities such as transport, storage, import and export of nuclear fuel, equipment, technology and minerals, which were earlier monopolised by the public sector.

  • This addresses long-standing barriers under the 1962 Act that prevented private ownership, operation, or sale of nuclear-generated electricity.

  • Reform of Nuclear Liability Regime:

  • A key deterrent for private and foreign suppliers- the operator’s ‘right of recourse’ against suppliers under Section 17(b) of the CLNDA, 2010- has been diluted.

  • Under SHANTI:

  • Supplier liability survives only if contractually agreed in writing, or where there is intentional criminal conduct.

  • The automatic liability for patent or latent defects is removed, aligning India more closely with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) regime.

  • This significantly reduces uncertain, long-term liability exposure, improving investor confidence.

  • Graded Liability Caps and Risk Differentiation:

  • The earlier flat liability cap of ₹1,500 crore is replaced with graded liability limits, linked to reactor size and risk profile.

  • This is particularly important for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), enabling smaller private players to participate without disproportionate risk.

  • Access to Capital, Technology and Execution Capacity:

  • By allowing private EPC firms, equipment manufacturers, and fuel-supply participants, the Bill helps:

  • Bridge the ₹15 lakh crore investment gap estimated for 100 GW capacity.

  • Accelerate project execution, addressing chronic delays seen in NPCIL-led projects such as Kudankulam Units 3–6.

  • Encourage innovation in SMRs, Bharat Small Reactors, and advanced reactor designs.

  • Conditional Scope for Foreign Investment:

  • While not explicitly permitting FDI, the Bill allows participation by “any other person” as notified by the Central Government.

  • Subsequent rules are expected to align with DPIIT foreign equity norms, enabling indirect or conditional foreign capital—particularly relevant for SMR manufacturing and supply chains.

How Central Government Control Over Sensitive Nuclear Activities Is Retained:

  • Exclusive Control over the Nuclear Fuel Cycle:

  • The Bill clearly reserves the most sensitive and proliferation-prone activities exclusively for the Central Government, including:

  • Enrichment and isotopic separation of radioactive substances.

  • Reprocessing and management of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

  • Production and upgradation of heavy water.

  • Custody of source material, fissile material and spent fuel, as reiterated by the Union Minister for Atomic Energy. This ensures that strategic autonomy and non-proliferation commitments remain uncompromised.

  • Strengthened Regulatory Oversight through AERB:

  • The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is given statutory status, enhancing its independence and authority.

  • All entities—public or private—must obtain mandatory safety authorisation for manufacture, possession, transport, operation, decommissioning and waste disposal.

  • This preserves the principle of “safety first, production second” embedded since 1962.

  • Centralised Control over Security and Emergency Response:

  • Security, safeguards, and coordinated emergency preparedness remain under sovereign oversight.

  • The Centre retains acquisition rights over nuclear installations in specified circumstances, ensuring control during crises.

  • State-Managed Liability Backstop:

  • While private operators must maintain insurance or financial security, government-owned installations are exempt, with the Centre empowered to create a Nuclear Liability Fund.

  • This preserves the State’s role as the ultimate guarantor in catastrophic scenarios.

  • Information Control and Strategic Secrecy:

  • Section 39 allows the government to classify broad categories of nuclear information as “restricted”, overriding RTI disclosures.

  • Though controversial from a transparency perspective, this provision reflects the State’s intent to prevent leakage of sensitive design, siting and operational data in a sector critical to national security.

Critical Assessment:

  • The SHANTI Bill reflects a hybrid governance model:

  • Market-oriented at the periphery (generation, EPC, finance, SMRs),

  • State-centric at the core (fuel cycle, waste, security, safeguards).

  • However, concerns remain regarding:

  • Dilution of supplier accountability and its implications for long-term safety culture.

  • Over-broad secrecy provisions potentially weakening democratic oversight, especially with private entry.

Conclusion:

  • The SHANTI Bill, 2025 recalibrates India’s nuclear policy by acknowledging that the target of 100 GW nuclear capacity requires private capital and expertise, while sovereign control must be retained over sensitive domains. It opens non-strategic segments to private participation but ring-fences the nuclear fuel cycle, safety and security under the Central Government. Ultimately, its success will hinge on transparent rule-making, strong regulation and uncompromised safety governance, not merely on legislative intent.