DAW 25th November 2025, Mains Answer Writting 2026

DAW 25th November 2025, Mains Answer Writting 2026

Question

Discuss how the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions have interpreted and limited the Governor’s discretionary powers. (250 Words, 15 Marks). 

Model Answer

Approach: Introduction:  

  • Begin by 0 

  •  

  • and Punchhi Commissions provide the most authoritative guidance on limiting gubernatorial discretion. 

Body: 

  • Explain the constitutional basis of discretion (Articles 163, 200, 201) and the pre-2025 judicial position restricting implied discretion. 

  • Discuss Sarkaria Commission findings: extremely narrow discretion, mandatory adherence to aid and advice, rare reservation of Bills, etc. 

  • Discuss Punchhi Commission findings: define discretion narrowly, six-month outer limit, etc. 

  • Highlight rationale: protect federalism, avoid central interference, prevent “pocket vetoes,” uphold rule of law. 

Conclusion: 

  • Conclude that strengthening federalism requires depoliticising the office, codifying limits on discretion, introducing accountability mechanisms, and ensuring Governor’s act with responsible urgency without undermining elected State governments. 

       

        Introduction: 

  • The office of the Governor- conceived as a link between the Union and the States- has repeatedly generated friction, particularly in the domain of assent to Bills under Articles 200 and 201. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and Punchhi Commission (2010), constituted to review Centre-State relations, provided some of the most authoritative interpretations on the scope and limits of the Governor’s discretionary powers, aimed to prevent the politicisation of the office and strengthen cooperative federalism. 

 Body: Constitutional Basis of the Governor’s Discretion: 

  • Article 163(1): 

  • Governor acts on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except where the Constitution expressly requires discretion. 

  • Articles 200 & 201: 

  • Relate to assent, withholding, returning or reserving State Bills for the President. 

  • Judicial Position Prior to 2025: 

  • Shamsher Singh (1974): Governor must ordinarily act on aid and advice; discretion is extremely limited. 

  • Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Discretionary decisions are subject to judicial review if mala fide. 

  • Nabam Rebia (2016): Discretion under Article 163 cannot be expanded by implication; it must be limited to areas explicitly mentioned. 

 Sarkaria Commission on Limiting the Governor’s Discretion: 

  • Discretion under Article 200 is extremely narrow: 

  • Only reservation of Bills for President’s consideration can be treated as a discretionary function. 

  • Even this is limited to rare cases: 

  • Clear unconstitutionality, 

  • Conflict with larger national interest, 

  • Where the Bill jeopardises the position of High Court (mandatory reservation). 

  • Governor must otherwise act on aid and advice: 

  • “Governor should not act contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers” while dealing with Bills. 

  • Withholding assent is not to be used politically. 

  • Time-bound decision making: 

  • President must dispose of reserved Bills within six months; reasons should be communicated. 

  • Preventing political misuse: 

  • Recommended neutral, non-partisan Governors 

  • Not “political appointees or active politicians”. 

Thus, Sarkaria Commission sharply restricted the scope of discretionary power, ensuring that the Governor cannot frustrate the legislative intent of elected governments.  Punchhi Commission on Limiting the Governor’s Discretion: 

The Punchhi Commission (2010) reaffirmed and further systematised limits. 

  • Discretion must be exercised rarely, narrowly, and with reasons: 

  • Discretion “must not be wide or undefined; it must be exercised only on constitutionally permitted grounds and with publicly stated reasons.” 

  • Six-month outer limit for action on Bills: 

  • Governor must decide- assent or reserve- within six months. 

  • Prevents indefinite delays and the so-called “pocket veto.” 

  • Governor not to act as an alternative political centre: 

  • “Governor is not an ombudsman or advisor” to the State. 

  • Any interference beyond constitutional mandate is impermissible. 

  • Institutional Reforms: 

  • Consult Chief Minister before appointment. 

  • Provide security of tenure. 

  • Consider impeachment procedure (mutatis mutandis with President’s impeachment) to ensure accountability. 

  • Restrict Governor’s discretionary roles: 

  • Remove Governor from statutory roles like University Chancellor, which create political flashpoints. Thus, Punchhi Commission further minimised discretionary space and enhanced procedural accountability. 

 Thus both commissions envisaged a minimalist, constitutionally constrained, time-bound model of discretion.  Why They Sought to Limit Discretion: 

  • Protect federalism (basic structure). 

  • Prevent Centre’s political interference through Governors. 

  • Ensure the legislative will have elected governments is not paralysed. 

  • Avoid indefinite “pocket vetoes.” 

  • Strengthen Rule of Law and constitutional governance. 

 Conclusion: 

  • Strengthening India’s federal balance requires limiting the politicisation of the Governor’s office while preserving its neutral constitutional role. The Supreme Court’s ruling improves democratic accountability but also cautions against judicial overreach. Lasting reforms must define discretionary powers, create review mechanisms, and consider an impeachment process for Governors. Above all, Governors must act with responsible urgency, ensuring they do not thwart the mandate of elected State governments and thereby protect federalism and democratic integrity.